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Article 6

THE IRON LAW OF FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS*

INTRODUCTION

The usual purpose of litigation is to obtain a valid judgment, that
is, a judgment leading to effective relief.' Normally, in order to be
valid, a judgment need only be a "final" judgment issued by the trial
court. Armed with a valid judgment, the successful plaintiff who was
awarded damages can begin executing on the defendant's assets.
When those assets are located in another jurisdiction, however, things
become more complicated. Plaintiff must enlist the aid of authorities
located in that jurisdiction to obtain relief, a process that defendant
often will resist by making a collateral attack on the judgment.
Because collateral attacks on judgments occur frequently, the rules
governing the availability of enforcement in a foreign jurisdiction
should be well understood. Many lawyers, and some academics,
however, do not seem to grasp fully the rules concerning sister-state
enforcement and collateral attack. This Article explores the basic rule
of sister-state enforcement and its limited exceptions.' This basic rule
is so clear and strong that it might be called the "Iron Law" of Full
Faith and Credit.
The Iron Law is predicated on the express design of the Framers
that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the Public
Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State."' The
purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause can be inferred from
* William L. Reynolds, Jacob A. France Professor of Judicial Process, University of
Maryland School of Law. A.B., 1967, Dartmouth College; J.D., 1970, Harvard University.
I wish to thank Kathy Montroy for secretarial assistance and Michelle Grunwell for research help. Many thanks to Bill Richman for helping me to understand the
incomprehensible. This Article is adopted in part and used with permission from WILLIAM
RICHMAN & WILLIAM REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1993).
Copyright © 1993 Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Effective relief is the goal of most litigation. Some litigation, of course, is brought
for other purposes, such as to harass (for example, the strike suit), or to obtain psychic
fulfillment (as any divorce lawyer will agree).
2. This Article does not address the enforcement of judgments in another nation.
For a general discussion of international recognition ofjudgments, see EUGENE F. SCOLES
& PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 24.33-24.45 (1992). This Article also does not address
the actual methods of enforcing judgments in other states.
3. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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both its wording and its location within Article IV. Based upon its
language and location, it is clear that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
imposed mandatory comity on the states 4 in the hope that treating
the judicial proceedings of other states with appropriate deference
would lessen friction among the states in the new and fragile union.5
The Supreme Court has held that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause demands rigorous obedience.6 Nevertheless, there are some
exceptions to the absolute rule of Full Faith and Credit. The first
part of this Article explores the source of the Supreme Court's
mandate. The Article next examines the two main types of exceptions
to the rule of absolute Full Faith and Credit. First it examines those
exceptions involving problems with the decree itself. Then it
examines those exceptions that may permit an enforcing state to deny
credit to a valid decree. The Article concludes with a discussion of
public policy in the judgment enforcement process.
I.

THE IRON LAW OF

FULL FAITH

AND CREDIT

If a court in state "F-I" renders a final judgment in a case over
which it possesses both personal and subject matter jurisdiction, its
judgment is entitled to full faith and credit in state "F-2," even if that
judgment is based on a mistake of fact or law.7 If the losing litigant
wants to correct the error, the litigant must do so in F-i's courts,
either on appeal or through some other type of direct attack.' Once
the judgment is final according to the law of F-i, however, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause prohibits collateral attack in F-2.' This is the
Iron Law of Full Faith and Credit.
This principle was strikingly articulated in Fauntleroy v. Lum. 1°
In Fauntleroy, plaintiff and defendant, both residents of Mississippi,
entered into a "futures" commodities contract, which was illegal as a
form of gambling according to Mississippi law.l '
The parties

4. See id. (stating that full faith and credit shall be given in each state).
5. Article IV includes several other clauses, such as the Extradition Clause and the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, which also are designed to alleviate friction among the
states. See id § 2. For a good general explanation of the history of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, see Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The
ConstitutionalFoundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992).
6. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 106 (1969).
8. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). For example, direct attack may be made in the form
of a motion to vacate or a motion for relief from judgment.
9. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
10. 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
11. Id. at 234.
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disputed the effect of the contract and submitted their differences to
an arbitrator, who made an award to plaintiff. 12 Plaintiff then sued
defendant in a Mississippi court to recover on the award.13 When
the Mississippi court became aware of the illegality of the contract,
plaintiff dismissed the case and later sued defendant in Missouri. The
Missouri court rejected defendant's evidence on the illegality issue
and rendered judgment for the plaintiff based on the arbitrator's
award. 4 When plaintiff sought enforcement of the Missouri judgment in Mississippi, the Mississippi Supreme Court refused to grant
the judgment full faith and credit because the futures contract was
unenforceable under Mississippi law. 5 The Supreme Court of the
United States reversed and stated emphatically that "[a] judgment is
conclusive as to all the media concludendi; and it needs no authority to
show that it cannot be impeached either in or out of the State by
showing that it was based upon a mistake of law."16
The Court scarcely could have picked a more striking case to
illustrate the basic principle of sister-state enforcement. Not only did
the Missouri court err, but it erred on a question of Mississippi law
and thereby frustrated an important social policy of Mississippi. As
the Mississippi Supreme Court stated, "If this be law, all that is
necessary to free the most corrupt transaction from all objection is to
obtain service on a party, and get judgment in another state .... ",17
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the Missouri judgment was
entitled to full faith and credit in Mississippi-the very state whose
policy was being thwarted.'" As Fauntleroy clearly indicates, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause requires that the doctrines of repose and

12. Id at 233-34.
13. Id at 234.

14. Id
15. Id,
16. Id. at 237 (citation omitted). The Faunteroymajority thought that its rule could
be traced to Chief Justice Marshall's pronouncement in Hampton v. McConnell, 16 U.S.
(3 Wheat.) 232 (1818), that
the judgment of a state court should have the same credit .
in every other
court in the United States, which it had in the state where it was pronounced,
and that whatever pleas would be good to a suit thereon in such state, and none
others, could be pleaded in any other court in the United States.
Id at 234.
A four-Justice dissent in Fauntleroy concluded that "[t]he ancient maxims that
something cannot be made out of nothing, and that which is void for reasons of public
policy cannot be made valid by confirmation or acquiescence, seem to my mind decisive."
Faunteroy, 210 U.S. at 246 (White, J, dissenting).
17. Lum v. Fauntleroy, 32 So. 290, 291 (Miss. 1902).
18. Fauntleroy,210 U.S. at 237.
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finality be given interstate effect. 9
Fauntleroy also illustrates nicely the "One Bite" corollary to the
Iron Law. The "One Bite" corollary basically provides that a litigant
is entitled to one, and only one, "bite" of the litigation "apple." After
the litigant has taken that bite, the Full Faith and Credit Clause
precludes the litigant from trying another apple to see if it tastes
20
better.
II.

INCONSISTENT JUDGMENTS

Although the requirement that a court give full faith and credit
to other states' judgments is strong, it is not absolute. For example,
ajudgment need not be given preclusive effect if the rendering court
lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.2 1 If F-2 refuses to
give full faith and credit to F-i's judgment because F-i lacked
personal jurisdiction, and F-2 later reaches a different outcome on the
merits, inconsistent judgments will result. In such a situation, the
question becomes: which of those judgments is entitled to full faith
22
and credit in a later action?
That was the issue in the famous Supreme Court case of Treinies
v. Sunshine Mining Co. 23 Treinies involved a dispute between a man
and his stepdaughter concerning the ownership of mining stock. A
Washington state court first held for the stepfather. 4 When the
stepfather introduced that decree in a suit in Idaho between the same
parties, the Idaho court refused to grant full faith and credit to the
Washington judgment on the grounds that the Washington court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction; the Idaho court then entered a
decree for the stepdaughter. 25 When the stepfather sued in Washington to quiet title to the stock, the mining company filed a bill of
interpleader seeking to ascertain the ownership of the stock.26 That

19. See id.
20. See id. In addition, a litigant who waits too long to take a bite may be estopped
under the default judgment rule from taking a bite at all.
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 104-105 (1969). But see infta
text accompanying notes 75-113 (noting that collateral attack on a judgment for lack of
personal or subject matter jurisdiction is limited to situations in which that issue was not
litigated in F-i).
22. See generally Ruth B. Ginsburg, Judgments in Search of Full Faith and Credit: The
Last-in-Time Rulefor ConflictingJudgments,82 HARV.L. REV. 798 (1969) (noting that the lastin-time rule is a means by which to choose which of two or more inconsistent judgments
is entitled to full faith and credit).
23. 308 U.S. 66 (1939).
24. Id.at 68.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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action eventually reached the Supreme Court, which held that the
Idaho judgment was entitled to enforcement.2 7 The Court adopted
a "last-in-time" rule, which means that the latest to occur of two or
more inconsistent judgments is the one that must be given full faith
28
and credit.
One advantage of the Treinies rule is that it generally simplifies
the task ofjudicial administration. If a third court (F-3), for example,
is asked to enforce the F-2 judgment in a case involving inconsistent
valid judgments, F-3 need only inquire into whether F-2 had proper
jurisdiction. So long as F-2 had jurisdiction and its judgment is later
in time than F-l's, the F-2 judgment must be enforced. Thus, F-3 is
spared from choosing between the F-1 and F-2 decisions in terms of
"rightness" when both are technically valid.29
The Treinies rule also fits well in the conceptual scheme of full
faith and credit. If F-2 wrongly refuses to give full faith and credit to
an F-1 judgment, it has committed an error of law and has issued an
erroneous judgment. Wrong judgments, according to the basic rule
3°
of Fauntleroy, nevertheless are entitled to full faith and credit.
Correction of the erroneous judgment must occur by direct challenge
or appeal in F-2, therefore, not by collateral attack in F-i or elsewhere.
A possible problem with the Treinies rule is that it might permit
F-2 to ignore its constitutional obligation to respect F-1 judgments.
Of course, in our federal system, proper adherence to the mandate
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is a federal question, and
correction of error always is possible through appeal to the Supreme
Court.3
Given the Court's workload,3 2 however, and the large

27. Id. at 78.
28. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 114 (1969);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 15 (1980) (noting that parties should be bound
by the later judgment so long as it remains unreversed).
29. This Article does not address the questions that arise when F-2 enjoins an action
in F-i. At present, the injunction may issue but the Supreme Court has not required that
such an order be obeyed in F-i. See generally Ginsburg, supra note 22, at 823-30.
30. See Fauntleroy, 210 U.S. at 237.
31. See Treinies, 308 U.S. at 77 (noting that the stepfather's failure to petition for
certiorari from a final Idaho decree precluded relitigating the question).
32. See DAVID H. VERNON ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS
609 n.3 (1990) (discussing the workload problem); see also Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 827 n.6 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("One might
argue that this Court's appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments in cases arising
under federal law can be depended upon to correct erroneous state-court decisions. ...
However ....
having served on this Court for 30 years, it is clear to me that, realistically,
it cannot even come close to 'doing the whole job' ..... ).
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number of state cases involving full faith and credit, effective review
by certiorari is really a forlorn hope."3 The real reason why the
Treinies rule is not a major cause for concern is that there is little
evidence today of the sort of parochialism that would cause state
courts to ignore systematically the constitutional mandate of full faith
and credit.
Although the last-in-time rule is easily understood, a problem
arises in its application when F-3 is also F-i-when, in other words,
the later F-2 decree is taken back to F-i to be enforced. Treinies
demands that F-i give full faith and credit to the F-2 decree, a result
that several state courts have resisted.'
The Supreme Court,
however, has indicated strongly that refusal to give full faith and
credit to the latter judgment is improper.3 5
III.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE IRON LAW I-PROBLEMS WITH THE

F-1

DECREE: THE RULE OF RECIPROCIY

There is a corollary to the Iron Law of Full Faith and Credit that
might be called the Rule of Reciprocity. The Full Faith and Credit
Clause requires that each state accord ajudgment of another state as
much respect and credit as it would receive in the rendering state. 6
A judgment that does not have preclusive effect in F-i, therefore,
need not be given preclusive effect by F-2. This Rule of Reciprocity
follows naturally from the purpose animating Fauntleroy;namely, that
our federal system does not require an enforcing state to give a

33. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONLICT OF LAWS § 114, cmt. b (1969) (noting
that it may be inappropriate to give conclusive effect to a second judgment when the
Supreme Court has denied review of that judgment).
34. See, e.g., Porter v. Porter, 416 P.2d 564, 568 (Ariz. 1966) (refusing to grant full faith
and credit to an Idaho judgment because the Idaho court had refused to give a prior
Arizona judgment full faith and credit), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967); Kessler v.
Fauquier Nat'l Bank, 81 S.E.2d 440, 44445 (Va. 1954) (refusing to grant full faith and
credit to a decree issued by a Florida court to the effect that a former Florida-issued
divorce decree was null and void, on the grounds that Virginia, which had based its
decision on the first Florida decree, was not required to reverse its adjudication simply to
give effect to a new Florida decree).
35. See Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402, 406-07 (1952) (noting in dicta that a state must
give full faith and credit to a judgment rendered in another state and sought to be
enforced in its state); see also Ginsburg, supra note 22, at 806-11. But see Colby v. Colby,
369 P.2d 1019 (Nev.) (recognizing an earlier Nevada divorce decree that a Maryland court
had declared invalid), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 888 (1962). This Colby decision is, of course,
clearly wrong under the Iron Law. See Fauntleroy, 210 U.S. at 237.
36. See supra text accompanying notes 7-20.
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judgment any more authority than it would receive in the rendering
state. 7
A. Judgments Not on the Merits
Judgments not on the merits make up one large class of
judgments that lack claim-preclusive effect. 8 What is meant by a
'judgment not on the merits" differs, of course, from state to state.
Nevertheless, several general observations can be made. Ajudgment
typically is said to be on the merits when it rests upon a determination of the validity of the parties' claims and defenses under the
applicable substantive law, rather than on some technical procedural
ground. 9 In nearly all jurisdictions, theie are certain classes of
judgments that are not considered judgments on the merits.
Examples ofjudgments not on the merits include those based on lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of jurisdiction over persons or
property, improper venue, or misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties.4 °
Such judgments indicate only that plaintiff chose to sue in the wrong
court or to sue the wrong parties. These judgments say nothing
about the substantive validity of plaintiff's case. Hence, a decision
against plaintiff based on "procedural grounds" in F-i should not
prevent plaintiff from raising the "substantive" issues again in F-2.
Similarly, a dismissal by F-i on the ground that plaintiff's case is
time-barred does not reach the merits of plaintiff's case. Plaintiff,
therefore, usually may sue in F-2 on the same cause of action if the
claim is not barred in that jurisdiction as well. 4'
An F-i judgment that produces more ambiguity, however, is one
based upon a demurrer or motion to dismiss for failure to state a

37. See generally WILLIAM RICHMAN & WILLIAM REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 107(c) (2) (2d ed. 1993) (discussing whether a judgment can be given more
weight by the enforcing state).
38. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 110 (1969) (noting
that ajudgment not on the merits will be recognized in other states only for issues actually
decided); SCOLES & HAY, supra note 2, § 24.24.
39. Saylor v. Lindsley, 391 F.2d 965, 968 (2d Cir. 1968) (noting that plaintiffs are
entitled to be heard on the substance of the action as distinguished from matters of
practice, procedure, jurisdiction, or form).
40. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (b) (stating that a plaintiffs failure to comply with court
rules may be grounds for dismissal).
41. See, e.g., Warner v. Buffalo Drydock Co., 67 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1933) (noting
that the case also may be time-barred by F-2's statute of limitations or that F-2, because of
a borrowing statute or some other choice of law rule, may apply F-i's statute of limitations
and refuse to hear the claim). See generaUy SCOLES & HAY, supra note 2, § 24.32 (discussing
the problems posed by statutes of limitations).
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claim.42 In many cases, such dismissals result simply from errors in
the pleading, and a subsequent well-pleaded complaint will be
permitted. In other cases, however, a dismissal on demurrer may be
regarded as preclusive because the defective complaint revealed a
central and irreparable defect in plaintiff's case. In the latter type of
cases, therefore, a dismissal should be accorded full faith and credit
in later litigation.
B. Lack of Finality
A judgment that is not final under the law of the state in which
it was rendered is not entitled to full faith and credit.4 3 For instance, in some jurisdictions, a judgment either on appeal or subject
to appeal is not considered final." Similarly, a judgment vacated in
F-1 is not entitled to full faith and credit in F-2.45 A judgment
subject to modification in F-1 also is not considered a final judgment
and need not be enforced by F-2.' For example, in most jurisdictions awards of custody and support are modifiable both prospectively
and retrospectively.4 7 The possibility of modification raises difficult
full faith and credit issues.
Consider a case in which a wife has been awarded spousal
support of $1000 per month. The husband pays support for a while,
but stops paying after moving to F-2. After six months, the wife
returns to the F-1 court and obtains ajudgment directly ordering the

42. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (stating that failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted is grounds for dismissing the action).
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLIrCT OF LAws § 107 (1969) (noting that
"judgment will not be recognized or enforced in other states insofar as it is not a final
determination under the local law of the state of rendition"); SCOLES & HAY, supra note
2, § 24.28 (stating that with the exception of support decrees, which may be subject to
modification and thus technically not final until the obligation has been reduced to
judgment, judgments that are not final in other respects may be denied recognition).
44. In federal courts, however, a judgment generally may not be appealed until it is
final. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (granting the federal courts of appeals jurisdiction over
"appeals from all final decisions of the district courts ... ."). On the different meanings
of "final," see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 13 cmt. b. (1980) (noting that for
purposes of issue preclusion "final judgment" includes any prior adjudication of an issue
if the judgment is sufficiently firm to be given conclusive effect).
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 112 (1969) (noting that a
judgment that has been vacated, however, will "be recognized in other states to the extent
that it remains a final determination of the issues decided under the local law of the state
of rendition").
46. See id. § 109 (noting that a nonfinal judgment need not be recognized in a state
other than the rendering state. A court is, however, free to recognize or enforce a
judgment that remains subject to modification under the law of the state of rendition).
47. See RiCHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 37, § 125.
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husband to pay a sum certain, $6000 in arrearages that have accrued
since his last payment, and to continue to pay the wife $1000 per
month. Three months later, the wife, unable to satisfy the F-1
judgment in that state, sues the husband in F-2. The wife now wants
an order from F-2 directing the husband to: (1) pay the $6000 in
accrued support under the F-1 lump sum judgment; (2) pay $3000 for
the support that has accrued between the date of the F-i judgment
and the present F-2 proceeding; and (3) pay $1000 per month in the
future.
The question posed is: which of those requested orders does the
Full Faith and Credit Clause require the F-2 court to issue? First, the
wife's request for an order concerning the $6000 in accrued support
must be granted full faith and credit in F-2 because it is a final,
nonmodifiable F-1 judgment.4 8 F-2, however, need not grant the
third request for an order requiring $1000 per month in future
support. Because most jurisdictions allow an award of future support
to be modified prospectively, and the Supreme Court has held that
the national policy of full faith and credit does not require F-2 to
enforce a judgment still modifiable in the state that rendered it,49 F2 is not required to grant full faith and credit to a modifiable award
for future support.
The wife's second request raises a more difficult question. She
seeks an order requiring payment of the support that accrued
between the date of the F-1 judgment and the F-2 proceeding. The
amount, while accrued, has not been reduced to judgment. In some
jurisdictions, support awards may only be modified prospectively; in
other words, the court may modify the award only with respect to
payments that have not yet accrued."
In other jurisdictions,
however, support awards are modifiable retrospectively as well. In
those states, a court also may review the propriety of the award with
regard to payments that have already accrued, but that have not been
satisfied.
Once the complication of prospective and retrospective modification is removed, the application of the general rule of full faith and

48. Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 86 (1944) (holding that a North Carolina court's
judgment for arrears in alimony, unconditional by its terms and not subject to modification or recall, was entitled to full faith and credit by a Tennessee court); Lynde v. Lynde,
181 U.S. 183 (1901).
49. Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 26 (1910) (holding that when an alimonyjudgment
amount is at the continuing discretion of the court that rendered it, no vested right to the
sums exists and thus no full faith and credit entitlement exists).
50. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDs, supra note 37, § 125 (noting that this latter position is
now the law with respect to child support payments).

1994]

THE IRON LAW OF FULL FAITH AND CREDIT

credit becomes clear. On the one hand, F-2 must issue the wife's
second requested order if F-i does not permit its support awards to
be modified retrospectively." On the other hand, F-2 need not issue
52
the order if support awards are retrospectively modifiable in F-i.
This case can be viewed as simply a more complicated example of the
general rule that F-2 need not grant full faith and credit to F-i
judgments that are modifiable under F-i law.
Although F-2 need not enforce a modifiable judgment, it is not
precluded from doing so. The leading case on the enforcement of
modifiable judgments is Worthley v. Worthley.53 In Worthley, Justice
Traynor indicated that an F-2 court generally should be willing to
enforce modifiable awards.54 The court noted that so long as the
defendant has been given an opportunity to litigate the question of
modifiability, defendant has not been disadvantaged. Moreover, it
would be unfair to require plaintiff periodically to reduce accrued and
unpaid alimony to an F-i judgment simply to obtain a final and
unmodifiable judgment, because the cost and delay involved in doing
so considerably reduce the benefit that the support order was
designed to produce.55

51. See Barber,323 U.S. at 86 (stating that a moneyjudgment of a North Carolina court
for arrears of alimony, unconditional by its terms and not subject to modification, was
entitled to full faith and credit).
52. See id. at 80 (citing Sistare 218 U.S. at 16-17, in support of the proposition that past
due installments of a judgment for future alimony rendered in one State are within the
protection of the Full Faith and Credit Clause unless the right to receive the alimony is
so discretionary with the court rendering the decree that, even in the absence of
application to modify the decree, no vested right exists).
53. 283 P.2d 19 (Cal. 1955).
54. Id. at 24; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 109 (1969)
(noting that "the Constitution does not forbid the enforcement in a sister state of a
judgment that is subject to modification under the local law of the state of rendition").
55. See Worthley, 283 P.2d at 25. The problem of interstate enforcement of child
support decrees has produced legislative as well as judicial solutions. The REVISED
UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, 9B U.L.A. 381 (1968), has been
adopted in some form in every state. In the 1958 version of the Act as well as in the 1968
revision, provision was made for the enforcement and registration of foreign alimony
awards. See id. at 540-50. Earlier versions (including the version available in California
at the time of Worthley) included such a provision. For a more detailed treatment of the
Act, see RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 37, § 125. The REVISED UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT, 13 U.L.A. 149 (1964), had been adopted in 42 states as of
1986. A new uniform act, the UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT, 9 U.L.A. 74
(Supp. 1993), also provides for interstate enforcement of child support judgments. See
generalyJohnJ. Sampson, Uniform InterstateFamily Support Act (with Unofficial Annotations),
27 FAM. L.Q. 93 (1993).
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C. Fraud in Obtaining the F-1 Judgment
F-2 need not grant full faith and credit to an F-1 judgment that
was procured by fraud.56 Because "fraud" can be a very slippery
term, the question really is: what type of fraud justifies F-2's refusal
to give full faith and credit to an F-i judgment? To answer this
question, it is useful to return to basic full faith and credit principles.
One of those principles is the Rule of Reciprocity, under which F-2
must give at least as much effect to an F-i judgment as would an F-1
court.5 7 Thus, F-2 may permit collateral attack on an F-1 judgment
based on fraud only in those cases where F-1 would permit such an
attack.
Fortunately, there is considerable agreement among state courts
on the types of fraud that justify a collateral attack. First, it is quite
clear that when fraud is an issue in the case, such as in a suit based
on the tort of misrepresentation, it is subject to the same issuepreclusive effect as any other adjudicated issue when raised and
adjudicated in F-i. 8 Second, many courts distinguish between
extrinsic and intrinsic procedural fraud; the former provides a
sufficient ground for denying full faith and credit to a sister state
judgment, the latter does not.
Extrinsic fraud refers to a fraud that could not have been ruled
on by the F-1 tribunal, i.e., a fraud that deprived defendant of his
opportunity to appear and defend. 9 A classic example of extrinsic
fraud occurred in Levin v. Gladstein. ° In Levin, plaintiff/seller (from
Maryland) and defendant/buyer (from North Carolina) had a dispute
over the quality of the goods sold. While defendant was visiting

56. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 2, § 24.17 (stating that "a judgment procured by
fraud may be impeached and denied effect in the second forum"). See generally Michael
Charles Pryles, The Impeachment of Sister StateJudgments for Fraud, 25 Sw. U. L. REV. 697
(1975) (discussing factors complicating the determination of the effect of fraud in seeking
out-of-state recognition or enforcement of judgments).
57. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
58. In this context, fraud is the cause of action, not a potential defect in the judgment.
See generally SCOLES & HAY, supra note 2, § 17.37 (noting that tort cases involving fraud or
misrepresentation present no major choice-of-law problems: even when the fraudulent act
and plaintiff's reliance thereon occur in separate states, the emphasis generally will be on
the state in which reliance occurred); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
148(2) (1969) (delineating the relevant choice of law considerations when fraud or
misrepresentation occur in different jurisdictions).
59. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 2,§ 24.17 (noting that "[e]xtrinsic fraud is thought to
go to the rendering court's jurisdiction, making the resulting judgment unenforceable for
that reason").
60. 55 S.E. 371 (N.C. 1906).
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plaintiff in Maryland, plaintiff had defendant served with process from
the Maryland court. 61 Plaintiff and defendant then met and resolved
their differences, and plaintiff assured defendant that he would
withdraw the suit. Relying on plaintiff's representation, defendant
returned to North Carolina and did not defend the Maryland
action." Rather than dismiss the case, however, plaintiff obtained
a default judgment in Maryland and then sued defendant in North
Carolina on the default judgment.63 The North Carolina court
refused to enforce the Maryland judgment on the grounds that it had
been obtained by extrinsic fraud.' The fraud involved was extrinsic
because it could never have been raised in the Maryland court.
Indeed, the fraud deprived defendant of the opportunity to make any
defense in the Maryland court.
Intrinsic fraud, by contrast, is fraud that the F-1 court would have
the opportunity to rule on, such as perjured testimony or fabricated
documentary evidence.6 5 Because the losing litigant had an opportunity to reveal the fraud to the F-1 tribunal, the losing litigant is not
permitted to raise the fraud issue by way of collateral attack in F-2.
Many modern authorities, however, have rejected this position on
intrinsic fraud. They argue that a litigant's knowing use of fraudulent
evidence may deprive her opponent of a fair hearing just as effectively
as tricking him into a default judgment.66 Further, if the defrauded
litigant could not have known of the fabricated evidence, then that
litigant really had no opportunity to reveal the fraud to the F-1 court
and thus should not be precluded from raising the issue in a
collateral attack in F-2. For these reasons, the Restatement (Second) of
Judgmentsdiscards the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud
and instead permits a party to obtain relief from ajudgment based on
fraudulent evidence if that party can show that "a reasonable effort
[was made] in the original action to ascertain the truth of the
matter."6 7 Similarly, Rule 60(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure now permits verdicts to be set aside if they were procured

61. I. at 372.
62. Id.
63. Id
64. Id.
65. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 2, § 24.17 (noting that in such a situation, "the
party's right to due process will have been violated, the rendering court's jurisdiction will
have been defective for that reason, and the resulting judgment should not be entitled to
recognition").
66. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 70 cmt. c (1980); VERNON ET AL.,
supra note 32, at 612-13; ScoLEs & HAY, supra note 2, § 24.17.
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70(c) (1980).
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by "fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party."' Thus,
Rule 60(b) "reaches all fraud and rejects the confusing distinction
between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud."69
Although Rule 60(b) and the Restatement promise to make the
fraud exception more readily available in enforcement actions, the
enforcing state still must inquire into whether the fraud is of the type
that would preclude recognition of the judgment in the rendering
state. An example is In re Marriageof Verbin,7 ° in which the Washington Supreme Court refused to give full faith and credit to a Maryland
custody decree. 7' The court found that the father had
falsely attested to the Maryland court that he was not
involved in [custody] litigation. ...
Although he later
admitted the fact of the Washington proceedings .... he
never fully apprised the Maryland court of their nature and
extent. The Maryland court thus had no reason to believe
Washington could or would adequately protect the best
interests of the children involved.'
Thus, the court refused to enforce the judgment even though a
Maryland court perhaps would have enforced it regardless of the
fraud. The Rule of Reciprocity73 should have been followed because
fraud should not prevent enforcement of an F-i judgment in F-2
unless enforcement would be denied in F-1. The Verbin court,
74
however, failed to make that inquiry.
D.

Lack ofJurisdiction in F-I

When a court lacks either personal or subject matterjurisdiction,
its judgment is void and, therefore, is not entitled to full faith and
credit in F-2. 75 That rule, perhaps as basic as the Iron Law of Full
Faith and Credit, is subject to an important qualification. A court's
findings on jurisdictional questions, like its findings on any other

68. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
69. 11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2860 (1973).
70. 595 P.2d 905 (Wash. 1979) (en banc).
71. Id. at 911-12 (holding that the decree was fraudulently obtained and was therefore
not entitled to full faith and credit).
72. Id. at 911.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
74. See Verbin, 595 P.2d at 911-12 (neglecting to evaluate whether the decree could be
enforced in its original jurisdiction).
75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 104-105 (1969).
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relevant issue, will virtually always preclude relitigation of that issue. 76
Thus, an F-1 court's determination after litigation that it has jurisdiction, even though "in fact" it does not, may preclude the parties from
77
relitigating the jurisdictional question in F-1 or in any other forum.
This is the basic application of the One-Bite Rule: Defendant
is
78
entitled to one, and only one, bite of the jurisdictional apple.
1. Lack of Jurisdiction Over the Person.-If the asserted defect in
the judgment is a lack of jurisdiction over the person, then the
situation is relatively simple. When defendant appears in F-i and fails
to object to the court's jurisdiction, she waives the right to claim any
jurisdictional defect involving her person. The defendant has in fact
consented to F-i's exercise of jurisdiction over her.79 Of course,
instead of appearing generally and consenting to jurisdiction,
defendant may make a special appearance for the sole purpose of
challenging the F-1 court's jurisdiction." When defendant appears
specially to contest the F-1 court's jurisdiction, and the F-1 court rules
that it has jurisdiction, a question arises as to whether defendant may
relitigate the issue of F-i's jurisdiction in a second suit to enforce the
subsequent F-i judgment on the merits. The Supreme Court
answered that inquiry definitively in Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling
Men's Ass'n.81 Defendant in Baldwin had made a special appearance
in F-i to object to F-i's personal jurisdiction. When plaintiff sued in
F-2 to enforce the judgment, defendant tried to raise the jurisdictional
objection again. 82 The Baldwin Court held that defendant's remedy
for an unsatisfactory decision on the jurisdictional issue is to appeal
within the F-1 judicial system and, ultimately, to the Supreme
Court.8 3

Defendant may not reopen the jurisdictional issue in F-2.

76. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 116 (1963) (noting that when the "jurisdictional
issues [have] been fully and fairly litigated by the parties and finally determined . . .
further litigation [is] precluded").
77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 10, 12 (1980); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 96-97 (1969).
78. See supra text accompanying note 20.
79. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h) (stating that a defense of lack ofjurisdiction is waived if
it is neither made by motion nor included in a responsive pleading).
80. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 37, § 30.
81. 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
82. Id, at 524.
83. Id. at 525 (holding that a defendant could not reassert lack of jurisdiction as a
defense in a Full Faith and Credit proceeding because the issue already had been
adjudicated by an earlier court and noting that "those who have contested an issue shall
be bound by the result of the contest and that matters once tried shall be considered
forever settled as between the parties").
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One complete judicial determination of the matter is enough.
A mere recitation in the F-1 judgment that the court had
jurisdiction is not, of course, the sort of "litigation" that would
preclude the jurisdictional issue from being litigated in F-2.8 4 If it

were, such a recitation could be included in every judgment, and
defendant would be forced to appear in F-i rather than being able to
default and litigate F-i's jurisdiction in F-2. In cases containing only
a recitation of jurisdiction, therefore, the defendant can suffer a
defaultjudgment in F-1 and then mount a collateral attack based on
the absence of personal jurisdiction when plaintiff seeks enforcement
of that judgment in F-2. That decision, of course, is fraught with risk:
if F-2 decides that F-i did have personal jurisdiction and enforces F-i's
judgment, defendant will have lost the chance to contest the merits
of the case. It is clear, however, that if the jurisdiction of F-i is
attacked within the F-i forum, then defendant must appeal any
unfavorable decision by the F-1 trial court through F-i's court
systema 5
2. Lack of Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter-If the asserted
defect in the F-i proceeding is a lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
the foreclosure of collateral attack is slightly more problematic.
Questions of subject matter jurisdiction implicate public interests that
extend beyond the interests of the litigants themselves. Because of
the strong public interest involved, defendant cannot consent to a
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, nor can the parties confer subject
matter jurisdiction on the court by agreement.8 6 Federal courts are
especially sensitive to defects involving subject matter jurisdiction,87
because a federal court that exceeds its limited subject matter

84. Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 468 (1873) (noting that "the
validity of ajudgment may be attacked collaterally by evidence showing that the court had
no jurisdiction . . . [and no] allegation contained in the record itself, however strongly
made, can affect the right so to question it").
85. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 37, § 30 (discussing further the Hobson's
Choice facing defendants).
86. 13 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3522 (2d ed.
1984) (noting that the parties cannot waive lack of subject matter jurisdiction by express
consent).
87. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h) (3) (permitting the lack of subject matterjurisdiction
to be raised by anyone at any time and requiring that it be raised by the court sua sponte
in any event). In the state courts, a mistake of competence is not always treated as a
"jurisdictional" error. In other words, some errors of competence may not furnish a
ground for collateral attack. If the error is not "jurisdictional" according to the law of F-I,
then F-2 must grant full faith and credit. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 106 (1969).
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jurisdiction may be acting unconstitutionally."8
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that litigation and
adjudication-whether correct or not-of subject matter jurisdiction
issues in F-1 may preclude their relitigation in F-2. In Durfee v.
Duke,8 9 plaintiff sued defendant in a Nebraska court to quiet title to
a parcel of land adjacent to the Missouri River. The main channel of
the Missouri River forms the boundary between Missouri and
Nebraska. The Nebraska court had subject matter jurisdiction only
if the land was in Nebraska. That question, in turn, depended upon
a factual determination of whether a shift in the course of the river
was the result of avulsion or accretion.9" Defendant appeared in the
Nebraska court and vigorously contested the court's subject matter
jurisdiction. The Nebraska court nevertheless determined that it had
Defendant later sued
jurisdiction and quieted title in plaintiff."
plaintiff in a Missouri court to quiet title to the same land. Plaintiff
contended that the Nebraska judgment was entitled to full faith and
credit, while defendant claimed that the Missouri court could
determine independently whether the Nebraska court had subject
matter jurisdiction.9 2 The question that faced the Supreme Court
was whether the Nebraska court's finding that it had jurisdiction
precluded relitigation of that issue in the subsequent Missouri action.
The Supreme Court held that relitigation was precluded and laid
down "the general rule that a judgment is entitled to full faith and
credit-even as to questions ofjurisdiction-when the second court's
inquiry discloses that those questions have been fully and fairly
litigated and finally decided in the court that rendered the original
judgment."9 3 In other words, the One-Bite Rule also applies to
prevent relitigation of rulings on subject matter jurisdiction.
It would be tempting to conclude that the rule of Durfee, which
provides that subject matter jurisdiction issues are precluded from
relitigation if they were "fully and fairly litigated" in F-i, ended the
inquiry.9 4 The temptation arises because the rule is straightforward,

88. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978) (noting that
the limits upon federal jurisdiction, whether imposed by the Constitution or Congress,
must be neither disregarded nor evaded).
89. 375 U.S. 106 (1963).
90. Id. at 108.
91. Id

92. Id
93. Id. at 111.
94. See id, The Durfee rule has been applied by the Supreme Court in a wide variety
of contexts. See, e.g., Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172-77 (1938) (holding that in a prior
bankruptcy proceeding the question ofjurisdiction over the subject matter was raised and
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succinct, and arguably correct.95 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court
also has decided cases that cannot be squared with the Durfee
principle. For example, in Kalb v. Feuerstein,96 the Court indicated
that subject matter jurisdiction issues may furnish a ground for
collateral attack, even after those issues have been fully and fairly
litigated.9 7 In Kalb, a state court erroneously concluded that it had
jurisdiction over a matter that Congress, in federal bankruptcy
legislation, had assigned to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts.9 8 The need to protect the integrity of the federal policy from
a possibly hostile or unsympathetic state judiciary was considered
strong enough to overcome the general rule of issue preclusion. 9
That result makes good sense because it prevents parties to an action
from negligently or deliberately ignoring or under-valuing important
federal policies.
To complicate matters further, the Supreme Court occasionally
has indicated that issues of subject matter jurisdiction are foreclosed
from collateral attack even though those issues never have been fully
litigated. For example, in Sherrer v. Sherrer,°° "litigation" of the
jurisdictional issue of the wife's domicile consisted only of the

determined adversely to the respondent; that determination was resjudicata of that issue);
Dowell v. Applegate, 152 U.S. 327, 340 (1894) (holding that a final decree of a federal
court exercising federal question jurisdiction cannot be treated as a nullity when
challenged collaterally); Des Moines Navigation & R. Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U.S.
552, 559 (1887) (holding that the Supreme Court of Iowa erred in failing to consider a
question of prior adjudication on the ground that the issue was not raised before the first
court by counsel for defendant).
95. See Dan B. Dobbs, The Validation of Void Judgments: The Bootstrap Principle, 53 VA.
L. REV. 1003, 1006, 1009-14 (1967) (noting that the rule has been termed the "Bootstrap
Principle" and discussing its general application); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 12(1) (1980) (stating that full faith and credit is not required when the
"subject matter of the action was so plainly beyond the court's jurisdiction that its
entertaining the action was a manifest abuse of authority.. . ."). The authority supporting
the Restatement section, however, is doubtful.
96. 308 U.S. 433 (1940).
97. Id. at 438-39 (noting that Congress, by its plenary power over the subject matter
of bankruptcy, may by specific bankruptcy legislation create an exception to the principle
that a final judgment by a court is not thereafter subject to collateral attack); cf.
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Illinois, 423 F. Supp. 941, 947-48 (Regional Rail Reorg. Ct.
1976) (holding that no preclusive effect should be given an earlier federal district court
decision when Congress had reserved certain issues for a special court on railroad
reorganization), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1095 (1977). See generally Bennett Boskey & Robert
Braucher, Jurisdictionand CollateralAttack, 40 COLUM. L. REv. 1006 (1940) (discussing the
common law origins of the underlying policy considerations within the Supreme Court's
decisions on the finality of jurisdictional determinations).
98. See Kalb, 308 U.S. at 438.
99. Id. at 438-39.
100. 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
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husband's denial ofjurisdiction in his answer. He did not offer proof
on the question, nor did he cross-examine his wife.1" 1 The Court,
nevertheless, held that the husband had an opportunity to contest the
court's subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, the issue could not
be reopened by collateral attack in F-2.10 2 Moreover, in Chicot
County DrainageDistrict v. Baxter State Bank,' there was no litigation
of the jurisdictional question at all.' °
The Court, nevertheless,
precluded collateral attack on the ground that the jurisdictional issue
10 5
could have been raised in the first proceeding.
Thus, the Court has given different and sometimes confusing
signals on whether collateral attack based on lack of subject matter
jurisdiction is permissible. Durfee holds that issues of subject matter
jurisdiction are precluded if they have been fully litigated in F-1; °6
Sherrerand Chicot County indicate preclusion may occur in some cases
even when little or no litigation of the jurisdictional issues took place
in F-i;'0 7 and Kalb indicates that in other cases collateral attack is
permissible despite full litigation in F-l' °8 The apparent difficulty
in reconciling these cases" indicates a conflict between two fundamental principles. One principle dictates that when courts act beyond
their subject matter jurisdiction, their actions are void. The other
principle dictates that final judgments should not be reopened.110
The difficulty in reconciling these conflicting principles, however, may
be more apparent than real. When the policy behind the subject
matter limitation is very strong, as in the balance between federal and
state power at issue in Kalb, courts will tend to permit relitigation."
By contrast, when the policy supporting finality is especially press-

101. ld. at 344.
102. Id. at 352 (noting that the husband's failure to contest the court's jurisdiction at
the trial level precluded collateral relitigation of the issue).
103. 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
104. Id. at 377-78 (holding that the jurisdictional question was null because it could
have been raised at trial, but was not).
105. Id. at 376, 378.

106.
107.
Baxter
108.
109.
tion).
110.

See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963).
See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 352 (1948); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v.
State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 378 (1940).
See Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438-39 (1940).
See generally Dobbs, supra note 95, at 1019-27 (providing one attempt at reconciliaBoth RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 12 cmt. a (1980) and RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 97 cmt. d (1969) articulate these two fundamental

principles.
111. See Kalb, 308 U.S. at 438-39.
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ing-for example, when there was full, fair, and vigorous litigation in
F-i, as in Durfeed 2 -collateral attack will be prohibited." 3
E. The Land Taboo
The preceding section discussed the requirement that F-1 have
jurisdiction in a case if its judgment is to be recognized in F-2.
Additional special rules apply to the recognition of foreign judgments
affecting real property located in the forum. The law can be stated
simply: an F-1 judgment that purports to affect directly the title to
land located in F-2 need not be respected by F-2. The leading
decision on this principle is Fall v. Eastin."4 That case began with
a divorce decree in Washington, accompanied by an order directing
the husband, over whom the Washington court had personal
jurisdiction, to convey Nebraska real property to his wife." 5 When
the husband did not comply with the order, the Washington court
appointed a commissioner who executed a deed in favor of the
wife." 6 Subsequently, the wife brought an action in Nebraska to
quiet title to the land in question.'1 7 The defendant in that action
was the husband's grantee."
The Nebraska court held that because
the Washington court lacked jurisdiction to affect title to land in
Nebraska, the deed and decree need not be recognized." 9 The
Supreme Court of the United States affirmed. 12
The majority
opinion in Fall stands for the principle that one state cannot directly
affect title to land located in another state.'12 To appreciate the

112. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, Ill (1963).
113. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments takes the position that the policy of finality
typically should prevail and that a judgment in a contested action (default judgments
excepted) should not be vulnerable to collateral attack based on lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 12 (1980). Section 12 provides
only three limited exceptions to this rule: (1) when there is a "manifest abuse of
authority," id. § 12(1); (2) when the judgment "would substantially infringe the authority
of another tribunal or agency," id. § 12(2); and (3) when the court could not make an
"informed determination" of its own jurisdiction, id. § 12(3). Case law supporting the
exceptions framed in § 12 is exceedingly sparse.
114. 215 U.S. 1 (1909).
115. Id. at 3.
116. Id. at 4.
117. Id. at 5.
118. Id. at 4.
119. Id. at 7.
120. Id. at 14.
121. Id. at 8. Justice Holmes concurred, stating that although the Washington decree
was entitled to full faith and credit, the Nebraska court could refuse to deny rights to the
grantee as a matter of local law, even if the grantee was not a bona fide purchaser. Id. at
15 (Holmes, J., concurring).
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scope of that rule, it is useful to consider two variations on the facts
in Fall.
The first variation supposes that the husband, threatened by the
Washington court with contempt, executed a deed conveying the
Nebraska land to his wife. The Fall majority stated that such a
conveyance, although executed under duress, would have been
effective.' 22 Although the actions of the Washington court in this
variation would have affected title to land located in Nebraska, the
husband's conveyance nevertheless would have been effective in
Nebraska. The difference between this hypothetical situation and Fall
itself is simply that, in the actual case, the Washington court attempted to affect title to Nebraska land directly by making its own conveyance. In the hypothetical situation, title is not directly affected by the
court.
In the second variation on the facts in Fall, the wife asks the
Nebraska court to enforce the Washington order requiring the
husband to convey the land in question. The question becomes:
what would have happened if the wife had sued the husband on the
Washington equity decree, rather than suing his grantee based on the
commissioner's deed? Would that equity decree have been entitled
to full faith and credit? Today, the answer is most likely yes.'23
When Fallwas decided, the answer perhaps was less clear because it
was thought that an equity court decree need not be recognized by
another state. 12 4 There, however, is scant functional reason to treat
equity decrees, as a class, differently from legal judgments. Consequently, commentators today agree that equity decrees should be
accorded full faith and credit, 125 and it appears that the Supreme
26
Court agrees.
These two variations on the facts in Fallsuggest that the Fall rule,
stating that only the situs forum has jurisdiction over controversies
affecting real property within its territory, actually is quite limited.

122. See id. at 6 (noting that courts may compel performance of its decrees by appropriate proceedings).
123. See infta notes 125-126 and accompanying text.
124. The distinction between a decree issued by an equity court and a decree issued by
a court of law arose from the early belief that equity decrees acted only on the person and
on the defendant's conscience. See generally Willis L. M. Reese, Full Faith and Credit to
Foreign Equity Decrees, 42 IOwA L. REv. 183, 189-90 (1957).
125. See, e.g., SCOLES & HAY, supra note 2, § 24.9; ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN
CONFLICTS LAw § 82 (4th ed. 1986). This is also the position of RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 43 (1980).

126. See, e.g., Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910) (requiring that a nonmodifiable equity
decree for support be given full faith and credit).
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Nevertheless, the Fall rule is longstanding1 27 and has not yet been
repudiated by the Supreme Court. Whether the rule can be justified
today, however, is not clear.
One possible justification for the rule is that because the situs
jurisdiction has a strong interest in protecting the reliability of its land
records, it must have the authority to ensure that those records are
not confused by foreign decrees. The problem with that argument is
that it is hard to see why a state cannot protect its land records
adequately without discriminating against foreign judgments.
Nebraska, for example, easily could require registration of foreign
decrees affecting local land in a manner that would preserve the
integrity of its land records.
A second justification for the Fallrule centers on the need of the
situs jurisdiction to ensure that questions involving its realty are
answered as that forum deems proper. There are, however, several
flaws with that argument. First, it runs distinctly counter to the
teaching of Fauntleroy, which holds that full faith and credit doctrine
requires the enforcement of judgments rendered by other American
courts regardless of how wrong those judgments may be.' 28 Second,
it is difficult to understand why a state's interest in protecting its land
is sufficiently greater than its interest in protecting its residents to
justify different treatment of the two under the Constitution. Finally,
the premise that the situs is the jurisdiction with the strongest interest
in the land often will prove false. As Fall itself illustrates, a decree
concerning land may be only incidental to divorce litigation that is of
far greater interest to another jurisdiction." For the nonsitus court
to resolve the questions before it properly, it must have the power to
act effectively on those issues. An increasing number of courts have
come to appreciate the weaknesses of the arguments supporting the
Fall rule and have chosen to follow the more basic principles
associated with the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Those courts have
recognized foreign decrees affecting land within their jurisdiction on
1 31
the basis of either comity' or full faith and credit.

127. The rule can be traced back to Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660 (C.C.D. Va.
1811) (No. 8411).
128. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908).
129. See, e.g., Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 14 (1909).
130. See, e.g., Weesner v. Weesner, 95 N.W.2d 682 (Neb. 1959) (holding that a Wyoming
court had the power to render a divorce decree affecting land in Nebraska and that a
Nebraska court had the authority to enforce personam obligations imposed by that
Wyoming decree). Note that Weesner was decided 50 years after Fall, by the same state
court.
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Why did Mrs. Fall lose? Assuming that equity decrees were
entitled to full faith and credit at the time of Fall, as they seem to be
today, Mrs. Fall lost because she misunderstood her remedy. Instead
of suing on the deed, she should have sued her husband or his
grantee132 in Nebraska on the decree.

33

Expressed in that man-

ner, the rule in Fall is indeed limited: F-i's orders concerning land
located in F-2 are entitled to full faith and credit, so long as they do
not purport to transfer title directly.

IV.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE IRON LAW II: F-2's ABILITY
(OR DUTY) TO IGNORE A VALID F-1 JUDGMENT
UNDER THE VERY LIMITED RULE

Lack of jurisdiction in F-1 and F-i's rendition of a "penal"
judgment based on anotherjurisdiction's laws sometimes are referred
to as exceptions to the Iron Law of Full Faith and Credit. The case
law confirms that an exception exists, but the exception is applicable
only when a Very Limited Rule is invoked.
A.

The Lack of a Competent Court in F-2

The law is well settled that a state may not refuse to enforce the
judgment of another state on the ground that the original action
could not have been brought in the state in which enforcement is
sought. That is the lesson of Fauntleroy,34 where F-2 was required
to grant full faith and credit to an F-1 judgment notwithstanding the
fact that the contract was made in F-2 and was illegal under F-2's
laws.

35

Any doubts about that conclusion should have been laid to rest
by the Supreme Court's decision in Kenney v. Supreme Lodge." 6 In
Kenney, Illinois was asked to enforce a judgment for wrongful death

131. See, e.g., Varone v. Varone, 359 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1966) (holding that a Michigan
divorce decree, including an order requiring husband to convey his interest in Illinois
land, was entitled to full faith and credit under Illinois law and was not subject to collateral
attack in a subsequent proceeding brought by the wife to enforce the Michigan decree).
132. It may have been that the husband's grantee was a bona fide purchaser. If so, the
grantee may not have been bound by the equity decree against the husband. See 6A
RICHARD R POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 904(3) (PatrickJ. Rohan ed., 1993)
(noting that the purpose of recording acts is to protect bona fide purchasers, whose rights

are afforded special status).
133. See generally Brainerd Currie, FullFaith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. CHI.

L. REV.
134.
135.
136.

620 (1954) (discussing methods of avoiding the Fall rule).
Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
Id. at 234, 237; see also supra notes 10-20 and accompanying text.
252 U.S. 411 (1920).
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rendered in Alabama. The Illinois court held that, because the
original action could not have been brought in Illinois, its courts
lacked jurisdiction over a suit to enforce the Alabama judgment." 7
The Supreme Court reversed, with Justice Holmes writing: "[I] t is
plain that a State cannot escape its constitutional obligations by the
simple device of denying jurisdiction in such cases to courts otherwise
competent." 13 8 Thus, a claim that has been reduced to judgment
in F-1 must be enforced by F-2, even though the claim is one that
could not have been brought in F-2 originally.'39 That policy is
strongly in accord with the principles established in Fauntleroy.
There seem to be only two limits on the Kenney doctrine. First,
a state is not required to permit a suit to enforce ajudgment brought
by one who lacks capacity to sue under forum law. 4 ° In AngloAmerican Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co.,14 for example, the
Supreme Court upheld the refusal of the New York courts to
entertain a suit between foreign corporations based on a foreign
judgment.12 A second limit on the Kenney doctrine is that a judgment creditor seeking to enforce an F-1 judgment in F-2 must seek
relief of a type ordinarily available in F-2.143 That requirement
ordinarily presents no problem because mostjudgment creditors seek
to recover a money judgment, and there are mechanisms for debt
collection in all states. The Constitution, however, does not require
a state to provide procedures for enforcement that are not available
to litigants in purely domestic actions.'
B. PenalJudgments
Discussions of penal judgments customarily begin by quoting
Chief Justice Marshall: "The Courts of no country execute the penal

137. Id. at 414.
138. Id. at 415.
139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 cmt. d (1969) (noting that
in a suit for enforcement of ajudgment, it is immaterial whether the state was competent
to hear the original action).
140. Id.; see also SCOLES & HAY, supra note 2, § 24.22; GEORGE STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS 119-20 (3d ed. 1963).
141. 191 U.S. 373 (1903).
142. Id at 375-76.
143. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF Aws § 117 cmt. d (1969) (noting that
it is possible that ajudgment providing for some peculiar relief will not be enforceable in
a sister state).
144. STUMBERG, supra note 140, at 118 & n.32 ("'If the plaintiff can find a court into
which it has a right to come, then the effect of the judgment is fixed by the Constitution
.... But the Constitution does not require the state to provide such a court.'" (quoting
Anglo-American Provision Co., 191 U.S. at 374)).
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laws of another."145 Marshall's words are relevant in two conflict of
laws contexts: (1) whether a court may refuse to hear a case based on
a sister state statute that is penal; and (2) whether F-2 may refuse to
grant full faith and credit to an F-1 judgment that is based upon a
penal statute. Only the second question is treated in this Article. 46
Valid F-1 judgments based on purely penal claims are not entitled
to full faith and credit in F-2. 4 7 In Huntington v. Attril'4 8 however, the Supreme Court considerably restricted the scope of this
exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause by assigning a narrow
meaning to the word "penal." The Huntington Court required
enforcement of a judgment unless that judgment was based upon a
statute that is penal in the "international sense."' 49 The Court then
noted that whether a statute is penal in the international sense
"depends upon . . . whether its purpose is to punish an offence
against the public justice of the state, or to afford a private remedy to
a person injured by the wrongful act." 5 ° That language seems to
establish a two-part test to determine whether a judgment is "penal."
For a judgment to be penal in the international sense, its purpose
must be to punish, rather than to recompense, and the recovery must
be in favor of the state, not a private individual.' 1
Applying that test, judgments awarding double or treble damages
are not penal so long as recovery is in favor of a private individual.
Wrongful death judgments also are not penal, even in cases where
defendant's fault is the measure of recovery, because recovery
compensates a private individual. Furthermore, a judgment in favor
of the state for tortious conduct against the state's proprietary
interests is not penal because its purpose also is compensation, not
punishment. Although the recovery in a tax judgment is in favor of
the state, the purpose of tax statutes is to generate revenue, not to
punish taxpayers. Such judgments do not fall within the Huntington
definition of penal and, therefore, are entitled to full faith and credit
52
in other states.

145. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825).
146. See RiCHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 37, § 49, for a discussion of the first
question. See generally Robert Leflar, Extra State Enforcement of Penal and Governmental
Judgments, 46 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1932).
147. See LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 125, § 75.
148. 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
149. Id. at 673.
150. Id. at 673-74.
151. See id.
152. See Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 279 (1935) (holding that
a judgment "is not to be denied full faith and credit.., merely because it is for taxes").
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F-2: THE PROBLEM OF
SECTION 103

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

F-2 may not refuse full faith and credit to an F-i judgment simply
because that judgment is based upon a claim that violates the public
policy of F-2.' 5 3 This part of the Iron Law has been applied rigorously. In Fauntleroy, the Supreme Court required Mississippi to give
full faith and credit to a Missouri judgment, even though that
judgment was based upon a "futures" contract outlawed in Mississippi
154
as against its public policy.
A.

Section 103 and Yarborough

Although F-2 must give full faith and credit to an F-1 judgment
even if the judgment violates F-2's public policy, are there situations
in which F-2 may refuse full faith and credit to a valid F-1 judgment
because recognition of that judgment would entail too great a
sacrifice of F-2's important interests? Section 103 of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws states that there are such cases: "A
judgment rendered in one State of the United States need not be
recognized or enforced in a sister State if such recognition or
enforcement is not required by the national policy of full faith and
credit because it would involve an improper interference with
important interests of the sister State."'5 5 In other words, Section
103 takes the quite controversial position that there are some F-1
judgments that are perfectly valid under the Due Process Clause, yet
not entitled to full faith and credit in F-2.
Much of the inspiration for Section 103 came from Justice
Stone's dissent in Yarborough v. Yarborough.156 In Yarborough, a father
made a lump sum child support payment to his daughter pursuant to
a Georgia judgment. 5 7 That payment, according to Georgia law,

This rule includes administrative tax determinations. See City of New York v. Shapiro, 129
F. Supp. 149, 154 (D. Mass. 1954) (holding that administrative determinations are entitled
to full faith and credit); see also SCOLES & HAY, supra note 2, § 24.23 (urging that all penal
judgments are entitled to full faith and credit, especially in light of the modern trend to
subject business entities to substantial regulatory penalties for toxic pollution, antitrust,
and securities violations, as well as other corporate misdeeds). See generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 89 Reporter's Note (1969) (containing a more complete
list of cases classified as penal or nonpenal).

153.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

154.
155.
156.
157.

See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

290 U.S. 202 (1933).
Id. at 206.

§ 117 (1969).
§ 103 (1969).
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exhausted his obligations to the child."'8 The daughter later sued
him in South Carolina, her domicile, for additional educational and
5 9 The Supreme
maintenance support."
Court ruled that the Georgia judgment was entitled to full faith and credit in South Carolina
and that the F-1 judgment precluded the daughter's subsequent
action for support in F-2.1'
Justice Stone wrote a sharp dissent based upon the "intent" of the
Georgia order and the strong South Carolina interest in the child.
Justice Stone first argued that the Georgia order was rendered with
the sole purpose of regulating the relationship of the parties in
Georgia, and therefore, the Georgia court had not intended to
control the parties' rights and duties in South Carolina.16 ' Stone's
next argument was far more radical. He argued that South Carolina
had an important interest in the maintenance and support of its
children and that a sister-state judgment ought not to be permitted
to jeopardize that interest. 6 2 Stone did not suggest that the Georgia judgment was invalid. Rather, he argued that the judgment was
not entitled to recognition in South Carolina because the Full Faith
and Credit Clause does not authorize "such control by one state of
the internal affairs of another." 6 ' The basic thrust of his argument
and the dominant theme behind Restatement Section 103 appears in
this passage from Stone's dissent:
Between the prohibition of the due process clause, acting
upon the courts of the state from which such proceedings
may be taken, and the mandate of the full faith and credit
clause, acting upon the state to which they may be taken,
there is an area which federal authority has not occupied.
...
In the assertion of rights, defined by a judgment of one
state, within the territory of another, there is often an
inescapable conflict of interest of the two states, and there
comes a point beyond which the imposition of the will of
one state beyond its own borders involves a forbidden
infringement of some legitimate domestic interest of the
other.164

158. Id.
159. Id. at 204.

160. Id. at 212.
161. Id. at 213-14 (Stone, J., dissenting).

162. Id. at 220-23 (Stone, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 214 (Stone, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 214-15 (Stone, J., dissenting).
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Despite Justice Stone's eloquence and the prestige of the
American Law Institute, it is quite doubtful that Section 103 provides
an accurate statement of the law. 65 Nevertheless, advocates of
Section 103 can look to Supreme Court cases in two areas for
support: 166 domestic relations and workers' compensation.
B. The Domestic Relations Cases
Williams v. North Carolina (Williams HI)167 provides the least
ambiguous support for Section 103. An earlier decision, Williams v.
North Carolina (Williams I), 6 had held that the domicile of a deserting spouse (F-i) has jurisdiction to grant a valid divorce. 69 In
Williams II, however, the Court held that the state of the matrimonial
domicile (F-2) could re-examine the jurisdictional finding of domicile. 70 Williams II provides that if, after according F-i's finding of
domicile "respect, and more,"' 7 ' F-2 finds the deserting spouse had
no bona fide F-1 domicile, not only may it refuse to recognize the
divorce decree of F-i, but it also may prosecute the deserting spouse
for bigamous cohabitation. 72 The holding in Williams II supports
Section 103 because it permits F-2 to deny full recognition to an F-1
judgment based on F-2's strong policy interest in marriage:
In short, the decree of divorce is a conclusive adjudication
of everything except the jurisdictional facts upon which it is
founded, and domicil[e] is a jurisdictional fact. To permit

165. See ScoLEs & HAY, supra note 2, § 24.21 (arguing that limitations on full faith and
credit are based on a policy of preclusion rather than on avoiding interstate conflict); see
also Ronald A. Hecker, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments: Law and Reason Versus the
Restatement Second, 54 CAL. L. REV. 282 (1966) (arguing that the Restatement improperly
relies on dicta and concurring and dissenting Supreme Court opinions).
166. There is another group of cases that provides support for Section 103, but no
appeals of these cases have yet reached the Supreme Court: cases in which F-I prohibits
a person from bringing an action in F-2's courts. Imagine that an F-i court with in
personam jurisdiction over plaintiff enjoins him from bringing an action in F-2. Plaintiff,
however, disobeys the injunction and files suit in F-2. Does the Full Faith and Credit
Clause compel F-2 to recognize the F-1 order and dismiss the suit? Courts in these cases
have held that F-2 need not grant full faith and credit. They rely on the notion that F-i
ought not to be able to control the workings of the F-2 court. See, e.g., James v. Grand
Trunk W. R.R. Co., 152 N.E.2d 858 (Ill.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 915 (1958); Lowe v. Norfolk
& W. Ry. Co., 421 N.E.2d 971 (Ill. App. 1981). See generally Comment, Extraterritorial
Recognition of Injunctions Against Suit 39 YALE L.J. 719 (1930).
167. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
168. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
169. Id. at 298-99.
170. Williams II, 325 U.S. at 230.
171. Id. at 233.
172. Id. at 233-34.
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the necessary finding of domicil [e] by one State to foreclose
all States in the protection of their social institutions would
be intolerable."'
Although the "intolerable" language above supports Section 103, the
Williams II holding is easily limited to the hornbook proposition that
the enforcing state may inquire into the existence of subject matter
74
jurisdiction underlying an ex parte judgment
The "divisible divorce" cases, Estin v. Estin 75 and Vanderbilt v.
Vanderbilt,176 hold that F-2, the wife's domicile, need not give full
faith and credit to an order from F-I, the husband's domicile, cutting
off the wife's right to alimony.177 Nevertheless, those holdings
provide only equivocal support for Section 103. Although there is
language in each opinion indicating concern for the important
interests of F-2 1 78 each opinion also contains language suggesting
that the holdings are based on the wife's right not to be deprived of
her property without due process.179 Thus, nonrecognition of F-i's
judgment was based on a litigant's due process rights, not on concern
over the policy interests of F-2.
May v. Anderson,8 0 a custody case, also is ambiguous in its

support for Section 103. The May Court held that F-2, the wife's
domicile, need not give full faith and credit to an order issued by F-I,
the husband's domicile, giving custody of the couple's children to the
husband.'
Once again, the case may be explained on two different grounds: concern either for protecting the policy interests of
F-2 112or for protecting the wife's due process right not to be

173. Id. at 232.
174. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 104-105 (1969).

175. 334 U.S. 541 (1948). For a thorough discussion of Estin and Vanderbilt, see
RiCHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 37, § 120.
176. 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
177. See Estin, 334 U.S. at 549; Vanderbilt 354 U.S. at 419.
178. See, e.g., Estin, 334 U.S. at 546-47 (noting that issues of bigamy or bastardy arising
from marital recognition or nonrecognition are legitimate concerns, and a state should
have the ability to guard its interest in these matters).
179. See, e.g., Estin, 334 U.S. at 548-49; Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. at 418-19.
180. 345 U.S. 528 (1953). For a detailed discussion of May, see RICHMAN & REYNOLDS,
supra note 37, § 127 (noting that May is an extremely murky opinion with its true
explanation almost impossible to decipher).
181. May, 345 U.S. 528-29.
182. See id. at 532 (noting that under Ohio procedure the writ of habeas corpus settles
only the immediate right to possession of the children, but does not settle the question
of future custody).
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deprived of custody by a court that lacked personal jurisdiction over
183

her.

In sum, all of these cases provide only scant support for Section
103's public policy exception to the full faith and credit requirement.
Given the tenor of the Court's other decisions, especially
Fauntleroy,18 4 the more likely reading of these domestic relations
cases is that the Court was concerned about protecting the property
rights of the absent litigant, i.e., the "stay-at-home" spouse or parent,
rather than about protecting the policy interests of F-2. That reading
is rendered even more compelling by the unwillingness of the Court
in any family law case since Williams II to permit F-2 to refuse to
recognize an F-i decree on the grounds of the public policy of F-2.
C. The Early Workers' Compensation Cases
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hun'8 was the first workers' compensation case to discuss the conflict between the mandate of full faith
and credit and the important interests of F-2. In Magnolia Petroleum,
the employee, a Louisiana resident who normally worked in Louisiana, travelled to Texas in the course of his employment, where he
sustained work-related injuries."8 6 The employee received a compensation award from the Texas Industrial Accident Board, and the
employer's insurer began making payments as required by the
award. 87 The employee later sought to collect workers' compensation under a Louisiana statute."a The employer pleaded the Texas
award as res judicata, but the Louisiana court rejected his contention."' The Supreme Court reversed in an opinion by Justice
Stone, ruling that because the Texas award was entitled to full faith

183. See id. at 533-34 (holding that the Wisconsin court could not deprive the wife of
her personal right to the custody of her children because the court lacked personal
jurisdiction over her).
184. Fauntleroy, it will be recalled, originated the "Iron Law" of Full Faith and Credit.
See, Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908); see also supra text accompanying notes
10-20.
185. 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
186. Id, at 432.
187. I& at 432-33.
188. Id at 433. The issue in workers' compensation cases is not whether the worker can
receive a double recovery. If a second suit is allowed and F-2's measure of compensation
is higher than F-I's, then the F-2 tribunal simply credits the employer for the amount of
the F-1 award and awards the employee the difference. The result is that the employee
can receive two awards from two states, but the total amount of compensation will be
limited to the amount proper under the statutory scheme of the state allowing the higher
award.
189. Id, at 433-34.

THE IRON LAW OF FULL FAITH AND CREDIT

1994)

and credit in Louisiana, there could be no higher award under the
Louisiana statute.' 90
In separate dissents, Justices Douglas and Black made the same
arguments Justice Stone had found so convincing in Yarborough. Both
argued that the Texas award was not intended to bind the parties in
Louisiana and that, regardless of the "intent" of the Texas award, it
could not bind Louisiana to a judgment in a matter so important to
Louisiana's social policy and interests.'
Four years later, in Industrial Commission v. McCartin,192 the
Supreme Court substantially overruled Magnolia Petroleum, relying
heavily on the "not intended" argument. Employer and employee,
both residents of Illinois, contracted in Illinois for the employee to
work in Wisconsin, where he was injured in the course of his
employment. 93
The employee sought workers' compensation
benefits in both states. 194 The parties reached a settlement in the
Illinois proceeding with a settlement contract that specifically
provided that the settlement would "'not affect any rights that
[employee] may have under the Workmen's Compensation Act of the
State of Wisconsin.'"19 5 Subsequently, the employee received a
larger award from the Wisconsin Commission, which was set aside by
a Wisconsin appellate court under the authority of Magnolia Petro96
leum.1
Relying heavily on language in the Illinois award expressly stating
97
that the award would not affect any rights under Wisconsin law,'
the Supreme Court reversed.'9 8 The opinion indicated, however,
that even absent such language, courts should be reluctant to
construe a workers' compensation award in F-1 to preclude a
subsequent, higher award in F-2:
But there is nothing in the statute or in the decisions
thereunder to indicate that it is completely exclusive, that it
is designed to preclude any recovery by proceedings brought
in another state for injuries received there in the course of
an Illinois employment. . . . [W]e should not readily
interpret such a statute so as to cut off an employee's right
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

I& at 444.

See id. at 450 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 455-56 (Black, J., dissenting).
330 U.S. 622 (1947).
Id. at 623.
Id. at 623-24.

195. Id. at 624 (citation omitted).

196. Id.
197. Id. at 629-30.

198. Id. at 630.
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to sue under other legislation passed for his benefit. Only
some unmistakable language by a state legislature or
judiciary would warrant our accepting such a construction.199
Predictably, "unmistakable language" is quite rare in workers'
compensation statutes because state legislatures ordinarily give little
thought to the extraterritorial effects of their workers' compensation
statutes.2 °' Thus, by relying on the "not intended" argument, the
Supreme Court carved a substantial exception out of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause for workers' compensation awards. 20 1 Although
the Court's reasoning is obscure, the exception seems to be policy20 2
based. In addition, although the exception is analytically suspect,
at least it had this to recommend it: it was easy to apply, and was
narrowly circumscribed because it appeared to apply to workers'
compensation awards and nothing else.
D.

The Thomas Opinions

1. The PluralityOpinion.-This cautious treatment of the Section
103 issue was abandoned by the plurality opinion in Thomas v.
Washington Gas Light Co.23

In Thomas, an employee who was a

resident of the District of Columbia worked for his employer in the
District, Maryland, and Virginia. 4 In the course of his employment
in Virginia, he sustained a back injury 2 °5 He received an award
under the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act and later sought to
receive a supplemental award under the District of Columbia Act.2 6
The administrative tribunals in the District granted the supplemental
award, but the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed,
holding that the Virginia award was entitled to full faith and
20 8
credit.0

7

A divided Supreme Court reversed.

199. Id. at 627-28.
200. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 274-75 (1980) (observing
that "a state legislature seldom focuses on the extra-territorial effect of its enactments
201. See McCartin, 330 U.S. at 629-30.
202. See infra text accompanying notes 209-213, 240-243 (discussing criticisms of the
McCartin rule).
203. 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
204. Id.at 264.
205. 1I
206. 1I at 264-65.
207. Id. at 265-66.

208. Id.at 266.
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The plurality opinion by Justice Stevens (joined by Justices
Brennan, Stewart, and Blackmun) rejected both the "unmistakable
language" formulation of McCartinand the strict full faith and credit
view of Magnolia Petroleum. The plurality rejected the McCartin rule
precisely because McCartin relied on the "not intended" argument.2" The Court noted that a state does have indirect control
over the treatment of its judgments in sister states because it can
determine the effect of a judgment by prescribing its effects within
the state.21 ° Once F-1 has prescribed the judgment's effect within its
own state, however, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court, determines the judgment's extraterritorial
effect.2 1 1 Thus, according to the plurality, by focusing on the
extraterritorial intent of the rendering state, the McCartin rule
improperly delegated to that state a power properly exercised only by
the Supreme Court. 2 The Court held that once a state has determined the domestic effect of a judgment through its judiciary and
legislature, that state cannot expand or contract the judgment's
extraterritorial effect by using "unmistakable language" indicating its
intentions.2 13
The plurality next rejected the MagnoliaPetroleum rule because it
was not consistent with settled practice. 214 Before Magnolia Petroleum, the states did not grant preclusive effect to sister-state workers'
compensation awards. 21' Further, the plurality noted that McCartin
had substantially overruled Magnolia Petroleum.216 In the thirty years
since McCartin, only one state had included "unmistakable language"
in its statute.21 7 Thus, the practice of most courts, both before
MagnoliaPetroleumand after McCartin,was to deny full faith and credit
to workers' compensation awards.
Having rejected the approaches of both Magnolia Petroleum and
McCartin, the Thomas plurality took a fresh look at the problem and
finally based its solution on the kind of interest balancing suggested

209. Id. at 270-71 (noting that the McCartinrule's focus on extra-territorial intent is an
unwarranted delegation to the states of the court's power to decide full faith and credit
questions).
210. I. at 270.
211.
. at 271.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 271-72.
214. Id, at 273.
215. Id, (noting that Magnolia Petroleum "effected a dramatic change in the law").
216. Id. at 274-77; see Industrial Comm'n v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622, 629-30 (1947).
217. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 616.525 (1979) (stating that any recovery constitutes a "full
and complete release of such employer from any and all liability").
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by Section 103. The opinion identified three relevant state interests:
(1) Virginia's interest in limiting the liability of employers within the
state and their insurers; (2) the interests of both jurisdictions in
compensating the injured worker; and (3) Virginia's interest in having
the integrity of its administrative proceedings respected by other
218
states.
The first two interests were quickly dismissed. First, the common
interest of Virginia and the District of Columbia in compensating an
injured worker could not be harmed by permitting a supplemental
award.2 19
In addition, Virginia's interest in limiting employer
liability did not receive much weight because an employee could seek
compensation under either the Virginia or the District of Columbia
workers' compensation statute. 220 Employers and their insurers
simply would have to measure their potential liability by the more
generous of the two workers' compensation statutes. 2
Second,
giving strong preclusive effect to a workers' compensation award
would place a premium on an injured worker's ability to make the
correct initial choice of forum. The Thomas plurality reasoned that
such an emphasis on forum shopping was inappropriate in an area
where proceedings are initiated informally and often without advice
of counsel.

222

With these two interests discounted, Virginia's interest in the
integrity of its quasi-judicial proceedings remained to be considered.
In assessing that interest, the opinion relied on an argument
originally made by proponents of Section 103 based on the distinction
betweenjudicial and administrative proceedings and the full faith and
credit due to each.223 The plurality drew a sharp distinction be-

218. See Thomas, 448 U.S. at 277.
219. Id. at 280.
220. Id. at 279-80.
221. See id. at 280.
222. See id. at 284.
223. See Willis L. M. Reese & Vincent A. Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to
Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 153, 176-77 (1949); Elliott E. Cheatham, ResJudicataand the
FullFaith and Credit Clause Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 330, 34146 (1944). Although the Thomas plurality opinion cites both articles, it does not credit
either for originating this particular argument. The dissent noticed that omission and
credited the commentators for the plurality's argument. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 292 n.2
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The argument, in fact, may have appeared even earlier, for
there is at least a hint of it injustice Black's dissent in Magnolia Petroleum, 320 U.S. at 453
(observing that "the jurisdiction of the Accident Board is limited to administration of the
Texas Workmen's Compensation Act; even if the issues of liability under Louisiana law had
been raised they could not have been decided by that Board.").
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tween a court of general jurisdiction and an administrative tribunal.2 4 Although the plurality believed that the factual findings of
both were entitled to extraterritorial recognition, the claim-preclusive
effect of an administrative award should not be the same as that of an
ordinary court-issued judgment. 25 On the one hand, in a court of
general jurisdiction in F-i, the parties can argue that the law of F-2
should control, and the F-1 court can decide this issue.2 26 When it
does so, it has before it the important interests of F-2 as embodied in
F-2's law. On the other hand, an F-1 administrative tribunal can apply
only the law that its statutory authorization permits, i.e., the law of
F-1.22 7 Accordingly, it makes sense to distinguish between an
ordinary judgment and an administrative award when questions of full
faith and credit arise. Because F-2's interests can be raised before an
F-1 court, F-2 may not deny full faith and credit to an F-1 judgment
based on those interests. Conversely, because F-2's interests cannot
be raised before an F-i administrative tribunal, F-2 may consider
whether those interests are protected when determining whether to
recognize the F-1 award. The plurality summarized its argument by
stating:
[W]hether or not the worker has sought an award from the
less generous jurisdiction in the first instance, the vindication of that State's interest in placing a ceiling on employers'
liability would inevitably impinge upon the substantial
interests of the second jurisdiction in the welfare and
subsistence of disabled workers-interests that a court of
general jurisdiction might consider, but which must be
ignored by the Virginia Industrial Commission.2
The plurality's argument, which can be labelled "the limited choice
of law" argument, appears to be a limited resurrection of Justice
Stone's (and Section 103's) notion of an exception to full faith and
credit based on the important policy interests of F-2.
2. The Concurrenceand the Dissent.--JusticeWhite concurred with
the plurality in an opinion joined by ChiefJustice Burger andJustice
Powell. Justice White challenged the "limited choice of law" argu-

224. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 281-82.
225. Id. (noting that because an administrative agency has limited authority, constitutional rules applicable to agency decisions are not necessarily the same rules applicable to
court decisions).
226. Id. at 282.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 285.
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ment with a powerful reductio ad absurdum hypothetical. He suggested
that the argument might apply just as well to an ordinary tort action
in which the F-1 court was constrained to apply F-1 law by a strong
statutory or judge-made, forum-favoring choice-of-law rule.2 If the
plurality's reasoning applies in such a case and it is difficult to
distinguish the hypothetical case from Thomas, then that argument
proves too much because it seems to require a wholesale re-evaluation
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.23 ° In Justice White's words:
[T]he plurality's rationale would portend a wide-ranging
reassessment of the principles of full faith and credit in
many areas. Such a reassessment is not necessarily undesirable if the results are likely to be healthy for the judicial
system and consistent with the underlying purposes of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause. But at least without the
benefit of briefs and arguments directed to the issue, I
by the plurality
cannot conclude that the rule advocated
231
would have such a beneficial impact.
Justice White advocated the McCartinapproach. Although he thought
McCartin rested on "questionable foundations," 32 he nevertheless
favored it over the plurality's approach because it was narrowly limited
cases and less likely to have untoward
to workers' compensation
233
elsewhere.
ramifications
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion, in which Justice Marshall
24
joined, also rejected the "limited choice of law" argument. 3
Rehnquist thought the plurality radically underestimated Virginia's
235
interest in the finality of its workers' compensation determination.
Because Virginia invested time and money in the resolution of the

229. Id. at 287 (White, J., concurring). An apt example is provided by Semler v.
Psychiatric Inst., 575 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1978). That case involved a successful wrongful
death action in Virginia followed by an attempt by the Virginia plaintiff to recover
survivor's benefits under the law of the District of Columbia. I& at 924. The court
rejected that effort, in part because the plaintiff could have sued originally either in the
District of Columbia or in Virginia. Id. at 926. Plaintiff attempted to analogize her case
to McCartin because the District of Columbia, unlike Virginia, distinguished between
wrongful death and survivor's recovery and would have permitted the later action. The
Court of Appeals, however, found it easy to distinguish McCartin and Magnolia Petroleum
on the simple (albeit conclusory) ground that those cases did not apply in an "ordinary
choice-of-law case." Id. at 930.
230. See, e.g., Thomas, 448 U.S. at 285.

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. at 288 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 289 (White, J., concurring).
Id. (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 293 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
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dispute, it had an interest in seeing that its resources were not wasted
by duplicative litigation in another state.2 6 Rehnquist's fundamental dispute with the plurality transcended these points, however. He
objected to the whole notion of "interest balancing" as a technique
for interpreting the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Rehnquist stated
that although the balancing of interests has a role in the choice-of-law
inquiry, it has no place in the discussion of the interstate recognition
1
37
of judgments:
The Full Faith and Credit Clause did not allot to this
Court the task of "balancing" interests where the "public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings" of a State were
involved. It simply directed that they be given the "Full
Faith and Credit" that the Court today denies to those of
38
Virginia.

2

Justice Rehnquist rejected the McCartin rule as well as the plurality's
"balancing" approach. Instead, he favored a return to the rule of
Magnolia Petroleum, which gave the same full faith and credit to
workers' compensation awards as to all other state court judgments.23 9
3.

Thomas:

An Evaluation.21P-Justice

White provided the

most practical solution to the workers' compensation problem. All
nine members of the Court agreed that McCartin rested on a
"questionable foundation. "241 Yet McCartin may be an adequate
answer to the narrow question of the interstate recognition of
workers' compensation awards. Surely the question of interstate
recognition of workers' compensation awards is an issue that it is
more important to settle than to settle correctly. On this narrow view
of the problem, McCartinis an almost perfect answer. It is limited in
scope, easy to understand, and difficult to over-generalize, unlike the
plurality opinion in Thomas. Further, unlike the dissent in Thomas, it
does not entail the dislocations that typically accompany the overhaul
of a thirty-year-old rule.242

236. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 295-96 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 296 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
239. Id. (RehnquistJ., dissenting).
240. See Stewart E. Sterk, Full Faith and Credit, More or Less, to Judgments: Doubts about
Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 69 GEO. L.J. 1329 (1981) (commenting on the
Thomas decision).
241. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 289 (White, J., concurring).
242. It is doubtful, however, whether overruling the McCartin rule would cause any
dislocations simply because it is unlikely that anyone ever has relied on it.
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As a solution to the broad problem of the conflict between
granting full faith and credit to F-1 judgments and protecting the
important policy interests of F-2, however, McCartin is totally inadequate. Nevertheless, it may be that solving the larger problem is not
so crucial. The question has arisen so far only in a few areas, and the
individual solutions in those areas seem to be adequately understood
and narrowly limited.24 3 Perhaps it is better to settle for individual
solutions than to search for a broad subsuming principle that can be
easily misunderstood or over-generalized. The individual solution in
the workers' compensation cases, however, rests on an unprincipled
distinction because these cases cannot be distinguished on a reasoned
basis. To those who believe the law should not countenance such
anomalies,24 4 only the Thomas dissent provides an acceptable solution.
Section 103, of course, is an ambitious attempt to solve the larger
problem of protecting F-2's interests, and support for its position has
grown since the plurality opinion in Thomas was published. Notwithstanding the increase in support for the Section 103 position, its
advocates can look for unequivocal support from the Supreme Court
in only one majority opinion24 5 and one plurality opinion. 4 6
Moreover, the majority opinion in Williams II was written half a
century ago, and its authority has been undercut severely by subsequent cases that radically restrict the opportunities for collateral
attack upon an F-1 divorce.247 Furthermore, many of the cases that
appear to support the interest-balancing language in Williams II can
be explained by the Supreme Court's concern for the interests of
absent parties, rather than by its concern for the interests of F-2.248

243. For cases in those few areas see Williams v. North Carolina (Williams II), 325 U.S.
226 (1945) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 167-168, 170-174); Estin v. Estin, 334
U.S. 541 (1948); Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957) (discussed together supra
text accompanying notes 175-179); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953) (concerning
domestic relations; discussed supra text accompanying notes 180-183); Industrial Comm'n
v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947) (concerning workers' compensation; discussed supra text

accompanying notes 192-202); and cases cited supra note 166 (concerning injunctions).
244. I count myself in that group.
245. Williams v. North Carolina (Williams I), 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
246. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
247. See Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951) (placing a heavy burden of proof on an
attack of an F-1 decree);Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951) (denying a challenge
to F-I 'sjurisdiction in an F-2 action because the jurisdictional attack was resjudicatain F-i);
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948) (refusing a collateral attack in F-2 upon an F-i
decree because defendant had fully participated in the F-I proceedings).
248. E.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948); Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416
(1957); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
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Finally, it is tempting to dismiss the workers' compensation cases,
McCartin and Thomas, as result-oriented decisions born of the Court's
desire to protect the injured worker at all costs. Although the case
for Section 103 today is stronger than it was before Thomas, it still is
based on two isolated, atypical lines of authority.249 To formulate
an entire theory of exceptions to full faith and credit based upon
such limited authority seems to be a classic case of allowing the tail to
wag the dog. In other words, the Iron Law of Full Faith and Credit
250
still stands strong.
Finally, Section 103 lacks a policy basis. Anyjudgment rendered
by an American court must comply with constitutional requirements.
By definition, ajudgment complying with constitutional requirements
satisfies our basic fairness and policy norms. It is difficult, therefore,
to understand how a policy objection to a judgment could ever
overcome the mandate of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
CONCLUSION
The Iron Law of Full Faith and Credit carries out the Framers'
hope that each state will respect the judgments rendered by the other
states in the union. The Iron Law permits one bite-but only one-at
the questions raised by the litigation, including jurisdiction. Other
limits on the Iron Law can be found in the Rule of Reciprocity, which
provides that the effect of the judgment is determined by limits in the
rendering state, and by a Very Limited Rule dealing with judicial
competence and some forms of personal judgments. Although some
authority exists for a public policy exception, the purpose of the Iron
Law of Full Faith and Credit should not permit any limitation based
on public policy grounds.

249. See supranote 166 (containing the injunction cases, which may furnish another line
of support for § 103, but none of these cases has been heard by the Supreme Court).
250. But see Bartlett v. Dumaine, 523 A.2d 1, 15 (N.H. 1986) (citing Section 103 and
holding that the court should not exercise jurisdiction over a trust, observing that the
Massachusetts courts "would consider a decision by this court.., as improper interference
with the Commonwealth's important interests."); see also In re Marriage of Verbin, 595 P.2d
905 (Wash. 1979) (refusing to enforce a Maryland custody order, citing Section 103 and
.public policy" as one reason for its action).

